Reflections: TWOOK — “A Reflective Educational Experiment (in times of illness)” (FULL VERSION)

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TWOOK — “A Reflective Educational Experiment (in times of illness)”, 1-6.  (pdf file)

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December/January 2015


Reflections:  Aboriginals in Canada and Two Possible Meanings of “Discrimination” 

“So there is certainly no lack of activity in our little boat, but is there any purpose? Is the tall figure who may or may not be the Spirit of Haida Gwaii leading us, for we are all in the same boat, to a sheltered beach beyond the rim of the world as he seems to be, or is he lost in a dream of his own dreamings? The boat moves on, forever anchored in the same place.” (my emphasis: words of Bill Reid on his own sculpture, The Spirit of Haida Gwaii)

And there was always the wind ….. and sometimes …… sometimes ….. the wind brought good news, and sometimes …… sometimes ….. the wind brought evil.” (my emphasis: Taken from the first of Inuit Legends, CBC Aboriginal, “Inuit Journey”: link)


 Spirit of the Haida Gwai

The verb “to discriminate” has come to have a primary negative definition. Basically, very roughly, it means “to unfairly treat a person or group of people differently from the rest.“ Of course, for the negative definition to succeed, the emphasis must be placed in the “unfairly” or “unjustly”. This is the reason why we speak of “anti-discrimination”; we wish to correct a wrong. But, for sure, there is no negative discrimination simply by the fact of there being mere difference: that Canadians see themselves as radically different from Americans does not imply discrimination in the negative sense. Thus, difference does not always lead to discrimination; but difference which is the result of a certain grave and prolonged injustice, surely does. Slavery in the USA is one blatant example, the treatment of Aboriginals in Canada a parallel one.

The history of Canada´s First Nations is surely the result of an unjust and forced differentiation. It is not just based on the now oft-repeated problematic phrase “we are all different”; it is more based on the idea that “we are so different, that you and yours must cease to be.” If lucky enough to be spared death, the “other” must still be so assimilated that this “other” becomes nothing but a crippled “us”. Such historical triumphs are truly essential defeats. In this regard, educating ourselves about the history, the nature and the consequences of the current discriminatory relationship we have with Aboriginals is but the first step in ameliorating the pervasive and noxious effects multiple non-Aboriginal policies have had  over their destiny, their sense of self-worth, their linguistic identity, their territorial self-sufficiency and their potential for political empowerment (see latest interview by Judge John Reilly in CBC’s The Current: link, and very important previous interview as well). This includes, as we shall see, most poignantly the ESL setting. Why so? Because the language issue is perhaps at the core of the mode of forced assimilation, even annihilation which Aboriginals in Canada have had to face. Now, before proceeding and in order to be clear as to what we mean by Aboriginals, it is important to note that in 2011, 1,400,685 people in Canada identified themselves as Aboriginal: “4.3 percent of the total population of Canada: 851,560 were First Nations, 451,790 were Métis, 59,440 were Inuit. (p. 8 of the excellent First People’s Guide for Newcomers created by the City of Vancouver and which should be replicated in each Province and downloaded by all ESL teachers and students: link .)

Fortunately though, “to discriminate” does not possess this negative meaning alone. To discriminate CAN in fact be liberated from a sense of injustice, from the permanent presence of the pain –an absolutely understandable, yet unimaginable, pain– that accompanies prolonged suffering from wrong-doing. Why is this positive definition so important? For an identity built on an injury seems to us to remain unable to move; a healthy identity necessarily must somehow move beyond mere negation of itself and the injurer. An identity founded solely on the hatred of the occupier seems to us destined to fail. In this sense, it is of great importance to emphasize that “to discriminate” is also defined as the mark of someone who can “perceive the distinguishing or peculiar features of a given thing/topic”. A dictionary provides the following example: “the human eye can discriminate between very slight gradations of color”. Such a skill is truly unique, it may perhaps be among the highest. For it takes great sensitivity, imagination and most importantly, intelligence, to be able to see the whole of reality in all its color gradations. In photographic terms, few can see the shades of gray; few are like Ansel Adams.

Unfortunately, in the case of our relation to Aboriginals, this more positive sense of discrimination is for the most part lacking. We non-Aboriginals fail to see even what appears most evident. In the case of Canada’s First Nations, and Aboriginals generally, our eyes continue to be blind to a kind of devastating differentiation which we ourselves (the non-Aboriginals) have initiated and of which we continue to be part of. In these brief pages we seek to begin to shake ourselves free –so far as possible– from such damaging presuppositions, specially as they appear in the field of ESL. Continue Reading »


Reflections: Political Thoughts on Sustainable Development (A Commentary on Professor Jeffrey D. Sachs’s Coursera course: “The Age of Sustainable Development”)

Having had the opportunity to start to undertake Professor Sachs´s quite informative and extremely educational course on Sustainable Development (SD) –now going into its 6th week— I would like to briefly express some of my concerns and questions regarding SD. Of course, as I read the Discussion Forums, many point to issues regarding the many factors involved in the implementation of the policies which SD allows us to better see and hopefully, to implement, specially in those cases of “poverty trap” in which the conditions are more troubling and recurring. No one wishes to live in inhuman hardship all his/her life; extreme poverty must be eradicated via a concerted effort, and by all ethical means available. In this regard, many of the now famous “TED talks” allow us to try to imagine the hardships and thus feel the importance of connecting lovingly for serious practical improvement: for example, TED talks by: 1) Bono, 2) Jacqueline Novogratz (specially the one regarding prostitution), and my two favorite, 3) Jessica Jackley, founder of KIVA  here , and 4) Bunker Roy founder of the Barefoot Movement here . Also, non-academic books such as The International Bank of Bob by Bob Harris, which tells the story of microfinancing success KIVA whose motto is tellingly “loans that change lives”, humble us and transform us in ways we could not even foresee. In brief, many are concerned, and rightly so, with practical issues. Many forum posts in this course come to mind in this regard. Let us just recall a simple one:

“Hello all peers,  My name is Abdikadir Daud from Ethiopian Somali region, I’m forwarding my thanks to the course   facilitator because I got extended knowledge from this course and I will transfer this skill to my communities .
Abdikadir” ( here )

Abdikadir from Ethiopia, like many of us from around the world, wants to make a difference.

However, my questions proceed from a very different area. They pertain to philosophical questions, that is to say, they deal with the core concepts, formulations and assumptions which must be put forward in the case of any given approach to the complex political and economic reality in which we live. P. Sachs himself does not tire of saying that SD is not merely a PRACTICAL path to CHANGE the world, but also –and more importantly— a THEORETICAL path to UNDERSTAND the world (Lecture 1, Week 1; and beginning of 1st Google Hangout, here ). He even goes so far as to say that it is a NORMATIVE framework which means it involves certain moral presuppositions. These convey the limits, for instance, for all business practices; not everything that is legal should be done. (see, for instance, 2nd Google Hangout: Question No. 4, “On the role of regulation of business.”) Consequently, my main concern regarding the EXCELLENT lectures we have been fortunate to partake in, is to signal –however embryonically– to some of the more puzzling philosophical underpinnings underlying the Sustainable Development Movement. This means that, according to such a critique, it becomes extremely important to undergo a rational critique of the core concepts which guide the interpretative self-understanding of SD. I believe that training in the humanities (specially, political philosophy) alone provides the impulse to see the real importance of such a critique, a political/philosophical critique. I also believe that, given this theoretical inclination, few of our fellow Coursera virtual classmates will proceed to consider the rest of this –much longer than normal– post!

Obviously –though I have lived half of my life in Colombia (which exemplifies many of the problems P. Sachs speaks of, and MORE!) and the other half in Canada (which exemplifies many of the benefits of which P. Sachs speaks of, and MORE!)— we must immediately confess that we do not possess the intellectual capacity nor the global comprehension that somebody like P. Sachs allows us to perceive in each of his engaging video-lectures for the Coursera course. We are but learners, poor in understanding. Be this as it may, nonetheless we will venture to point to what I consider to be some extremely troubling silences and/or omissions which may make us –should make us– question SD forcefully.

Now, although I have already tweeted  to #susdev some general short questions, for instance: 1) “ #susdev Suppose we ALL were middle-income citizens of the world. Is that enough? Would our spirit not lose sight of what is MOST important?”, or 2) “ #susdev Isn´t there a rhetorical identification between “extreme poverty” and “poverty” which does not allow for a real critique of SD goals?”, still –as mentioned above– our concern in this post is somewhat more detailed or profound.

We could say that SD, in general —and Clinical Economics, in particular— could be giving us a “differential diagnosis” that may SEEM to point to the root cause of things, variable as they may be, but which may end up REALLY missing the CORE causes of the general “disease” with which some thinkers believe we are currently afflicted as moderns and post-moderns. And by missing some of the CORE causes, it might not be providing the best “medicine(s)” available/desirable. In the philosophical arena, the most radical critics in this regard would be those who follow Heidegger´s powerful critique of technology. Though extremely important, we shall not go into that camp here in detail.

Rather, using P. Sachs own clinical analogy, we can say that it is common nowadays to see traditional Western medicine incapable of treating complex diseases which do not have to deal with physical trauma or life-death situations. Chronic illness, such as different forms of arthritis/fibromyalgia, are a case in point. Of course, P. Sachs´s views seem to us to be much more akin to alternative medicine, in this respect. For one of the basic tenets of alternative medicine is that each patient is UNIQUE. So, each country, according to “Differential Clinical Economics” is likewise, quite UNIQUE. P. Sachs does not tire of saying that a holistic approach to the healing of poverty cannot be founded on a single linear conception of cause. Failing to understand this uniqueness may in fact worsen the situation beyond recovery. In medicine, one need only bring to mind the controversy over the drug Celebrex which not only did not actually cure your arthritis (it simply alleviated the pain), but actually –with certainty– damaged your heart! The history of many other drugs follows this pattern, unfortunately. In political life, the current political turmoil of countries such as our feverish neighbor Venezuela, may be thought to be something akin. As you will see, given the spirit of this post, one truly wonders what P. Sachs´s thoughts are on the current crisis in Venezuela, precisely because its regime claims to hold power for the poor. However that may be, P. Sachs —who also helped Bolivia during its feverish times— summarizes this view well:

“The modern doctor is expected to diagnose the specific causes of a specific patient’s illness and to offer a specific prescription that is accurately honed to that patient’s conditions and needs. The modern economist should do the same in diagnosing the persistence of poverty.” (our emphasis; Chapter 4: “Why Some Countries Developed While Others Stayed Poor, I. The Idea of Clinical Economics”)


Thus, one imagines that if P. Sachs himself were to fall ill, he would most likely search for an alternative medicine center rather than a traditional monolithic hospital built on unquestioned homogeneous forms of understanding, (or better yet, both if possible, for not all traditional doctors are self-enclosed and not all alternative doctors are truly open). The drama of the latest candidate for the Oscar Awards which deals with HIV/Aids –the compelling movie, Dallas Buyers Club—exemplifies all these tensions perfectly. For we, who have been sick, know well that the sick are among the poorest, mind you.

But, as you will see below, our critique could be said to involve a much more intense and alternative diagnosis than the one which P. Sachs offers. It would be an alternative to the alternative; but much more troubling. It would be an alternative that would show –if someday made fully explicit– that the alternative provided by SD is, in the end, really, really, not so much of an alternative except in the imagination, albeit with some crucial exceptions, among them, that of the eradication of extreme poverty itself. The idealistic overtones of SD would be seen thus to be constantly destabilized by the realistic peculiarities of localities, by a kind of non-Machiavellian political realism (i.e., much closer to Thucydides´s) and by certain “intractables” of human nature. Or to be less severe and less cranky (!) —for we know, as its students, that SD has partially succeeded IN REALITY through exciting models such as those of the Millennium Villages– one could say that the goals of SD, for instance, the Eight Millennium Development Goals (MDG´S), must be corrected with recourse to another tradition which not only sets the hierarchy of these goals aright, but also may add some which may have been altogether forgotten in SD differential diagnosis, however complete it claims to be. ( here )

Continue Reading »


(For the nature of the sections see the “General Introduction”, here.)

Abbreviations: Ar. = Aristotle, AQ= Aquinas, NE = Nicomachean Ethics, EE= Eudemian Ethics




“With these things defined, let us examine closely whether happiness is something praised or rather honored, for it is clear it does not belong among the capacities, at any rate. Now, everything praised appears to be praised for its being of a certain sort and for its condition relative to something: we praise the just person, the courageous person, and, in general, the good person as well as virtue itself, on account of the action and works involved; and we praise the strong man and the swift runner and each of the rest for their being, by nature, of a certain sort and for their condition in relation to something good and serious. This is also clear on the basis of the praises offered to the gods, since it is manifestly laughable for them to be compared to us; but this happens because praise arises through comparison, as we said.  And if praise is of things of that sort, it is clear that not praise, but something greater and better than praise applies to the best things, as in fact appears to be the case: the gods we deem blessed and happy, and the most divine of men we deem blessed.

The case is similar with the good things too, none praise happiness the way they praise justice; rather, people deem happiness a blessed thing, on the grounds that it is something more divine and better. And Eodoxus too seems to have nobly pleaded his case that the first prize belongs to pleasure. For the fact that it is not praised as being among the good things reveals, he supposed, that it is superior to the things praised; and such, he supposed, is the god and the good. For it is to these that all else is compared. Indeed, praise belongs to virtue: people are apt to do noble things as a result of virtue, whereas encomiums belong to the works of both body and soul alike. But perhaps being very precise about these things is more appropriate to those who have labored over encomiums; to us it is clear, on the basis of what has been said, that happiness belongs among the things that are honored and complete. This seems to be the case also on account of its being a principle: for it is for the sake of this that we all do everything else, and we posit the principle and the cause of the good things as being something honorable and divine. ” (NE, 1101b10-1102a4; Aristotle´s Nicomachean Ethics, Bartlett, Robert, and Collins, Susan; University of Chicago, Chicago, 2011)


1) Aren’t we somewhat caught off guard by the sudden appearance of this extremely short and striking, not to say strange and foreign, subsection? But then again, should be really SO surprised by its appearance if we have listened carefully to what Ar. has said (and not said) in previous subsections? For isn’t this subsection a “recapitulation” of sorts? Doesn’t Ar. here once again mention the courageous man and the just man, the exemplars of political life in a sense? For, what is there to be of political life without its defenders in battle and its defenders in virtue? And, what is there to be of political life without the just and their healthy obedient submission to the law? But also, doesn’t Ar. mention once again the athletic humans who, we imagine, participate in the kind of competitions Ar. mentioned way back in subsection I, 8; namely, the swift runner/the strong man? Weren´t we there led to think, like Nietzsche has us believe about that Greeks, that Ar. too favored primarily this competitive politically inspired spirit (for the athlete, as in the Olympics, REPRESENTS his city/nation, doesn’t he?)? And, if happiness is related not to a capacity as Ar. himself puts it here (though he will question this at 2.1 and 2.5 (see section IV below)), but rather perhaps to a kind of activity (let us assume so for a moment), then —to our amazement— this ODD short section would certainly seem to point out that the highest form of activity is NOT that characteristic of those who consider themselves and are considered to be the just and the courageous and the sportive within society, wouldn’t it? But honestly speaking, who could be more active than, for instance, the courageous? Isn´t war THE action par excellence? “But what, more exactly, is so astounding?”, a reader might ask. Well, precisely that if we are looking for the architectonic science which “calls the shots” as regards the good and happiness, then even here, when we are just barely finishing ONLY BOOK I of the NE —–out of 10 difficult books all complex in their own right, and besides without ANY sustained argumentation having explicitly pointed in this direction—— Ar. CLEARLY gives the adherents to political life previously mentioned as “appearing” to be the architectonic good (I, 2) ONLY a SECONDARY position, doesn’t he? And if all this is at least half so, then we need ask why many interpreters are so SURPRISED, as we have argued in previous subsections, once Ar. reaches similar conclusions at the END of the NE in Book X? Put another way, what is it about OUR current paradigmatic forms of philosophical understanding that the overall direction of Ar. own thought cannot be seen, let alone properly appreciated? However, in the just and courageous defense of ourselves: haven’t OUR commentaries at least pointed —- however inadequately, of course—- in THIS direction? For instance, haven’t we painstakingly mentioned again and again the “conundrums of courage”? That is to say, how exactly will courage in defending one´s own come to line up with the happiness in being one´s own?

But let us move back a bit, and ask again: How exactly did we GET HERE? What if this passage held the KEY to the whole of the NE? Actually, one could argue that one could seriously dedicate one’s whole life to an understanding of this passage alone, couldn’t one? But also, isn’t what we learn from other commentators even more revealing and perplexing in this regard?  For isn’t it striking to see, for instance JOACHIM —in his very detailed, almost line-by-line commentary—- speaking of this passage in the following terms: “The passage has no philosophical interest, as indeed Aristotle himself recognizes … when he says that the topic is more appropriate (to those who have made a study of encomia) (Joachim, p. 61) But, why exactly does Joachim say it has “no philosophical interest”, as IF Ar. here ONLY, or even primarily, spoke of encomia? Perhaps, wouldn’t it be more precise to say that it is of no philosophical interest to JOACHIM? (!) For wouldn’t it be odd that Ar., who is so careful in all his philosophical endeavors, once again slipped up —do remember how we were once told there were three lives only to find out there were really, really four (!)——and added a subsection which was really, really, not relevant as Joachim claims? Wouldn’t that kind of interpretative attitude be in the same ballpark as those who say that the books on the virtues must be “skipped over as irrelevant”? But isn’t this a kind of a reflective surrender? For even if we cannot fully ANSWER a puzzle, shouldn’t we at least RECOGNIZE the puzzle for what it is in the first place? And what if our philosophical interests as MODERN philosophers were genuinely FOREIGN to those of Aristotle? Wouldn’t it then become OBVIOUS that we wouldn’t see them? For what if we could not even see the problematic nature of justice itself (one might think of the differing roles played by the Greek dikaiosune in Ar.,  in contrast to the concept of Recht in both Kant and Hegel: for a personal political example see here)? Moreover, aren´t we also struck by the fact that this subsection 12 of BOOK I is kind of a conclusion —–or very close to a conclusion, as Book I is composed of 13 subsections—– to the introductory BOOK I we are almost about to finish?

Let us be a bit bold before looking at the details: could this be making explicit Ar.‘s own hypothesis which will, following Plato’s dialectical reasoning in the Republic, truly be a steppingstone by means of which we will ascend to give the principle which at the start must be assumed, its real power, argumentative solidity and living strength? As Plato allows Socrates to say:

“Well, then, go on to understand that by the other segment of the intelligible I mean that which argument itself grasps with the power of dialectic, making the hypotheses not beginnings but really hypotheses—that is, steppingstones and springboards—in order to reach what is free from hypothesis at the beginning of the whole. When it has grasped this, argument now depends on that which depends on this beginning and in such fashion goes back down again to an end;”(my emphasis: Republic, 511b)

And thus we ask, conscious we are entering deep waters: will we (or better, some of Ar. listeners) by the end of the NE be much less puzzled and much more aware about why this passage reveals the direction of the whole: that is to say, the whole of the text, and even the whole of our lives?  Isn’t this why Ar. ends this extremely strange subsection by SUDDENLY making reference to THE principle (arche)? That is to say, doesn´t he write as regards happiness (eudaimonia):

This seems to be the case also on account of its being a principle: for it is for the sake of this that we all do everything else, and we posit the principle and the cause of the good things as being something honorable and divine.”

Or put yet another way, what we mean to ask dialectically is whether by the end of the NE this principle posited as a hypothesis (understood as a steppingstone) will have been rationally proven to be THE principle by which some of us choose to lead our lives (and perhaps aid a few interested others in at least trying to have a faint image of its presence)? Or put still another way, will this principle achieve life beyond mere formality, freeing the hypothesis “at the beginning of the whole”? Or will we, pace Ar., end up in a kind of Kantian formalism which remains quite aloof both from the way the best of statesmen/stateswomen actually do lead their political, as well as from the way the best of living philosophers live theirs?

2) But leaving aside such perplexing —perhaps even counterproductive (!)—- generalities,we must ask as regards the specifics of the subsection: why does Ar. ONCE again give us an either/or, namely happiness is EITHER praised OR honored? Why not leave it at its being USEFUL, as modern Utilitarianism has it? Or, why not take the AESTHETIC route as Nietzsche does in his reference to Stendhal?  Or, why not leave it at CIVILITY as in Locke? Why is Ar. so reticent to go DOWN these modern roads? Isn´t Ar., instead, rather keen on puzzling philosophically about utility, beauty and civility (nobility)? Why don´t WE seem to puzzle thus? Or, from a different point of view: don´t we find in the religious Spanish word “alabar”, for instance, BOTH a praising and an honoring of God? I mean, does THAT difference —between praising and honoring—  make ANY sense as we read the Bible (see section III below)? Is there really ANY difference between praising and honoring God in the Bible? What is Ar. getting at then? Why does he wish to separate them thus, and so poignantly? Where is the alleged “Aristotelian flexibility” so many interpreters seem to speak of, to be found here? Or, is it rather than when seeking rationally the TRUTH about the essential, tough choices are in order?

For truly Ar. says, happiness can be either something PRAISED (τῶν ἐπαινετῶν) OR something honored (τῶν τιμίων)? But doesn´t this assertion lead US to an even more EXTREME puzzle? For doesn’t Ar. seem to be going at the argument as if HE HAD NEVER said anything about honor in the first place? However, didn’t he tell us  —in what, it is true, seems a long time ago— that the life of honor is only SECONDARY to that of contemplation (the latter which of course, as we pointed out, Ar. mentioned ONLY to silence immediately!). But shouldn’t WE refresh our memory and recall the words Ar. had told us just some subsections before as regards the nature of “honor”, namely: but it appears to be more superficial than what is being sought, for honor seems to reside more with those who bestow it than with him who receives it; and we divine that the good is something of one’s own and a thing not easily taken away”? So, a bit dizzy we ask: do we understand clearly? According to subsection I, 5, the life of honor is NOT the highest in part because it depends on the recognition by others, right? But NOW Ar. asks us to consider the question as to whether happiness is PRAISED OR HONORED? But isn’t what we hear here about praise EXTREMELY akin to what we have heard about honor previously, specially as regards its being dependent on others? Let’s listen to what Ar. himself has to say regarding PRAISE in THIS subsection I, 12: “Now, everything praised appears to be praised for its being of a certain sort and for its condition relative to somethingbecause praise arises through comparison.” Now we need ask, what makes these two —-that is to say, the honor of previous subsections and the praise of this subsection—– SO different? And to make things even MORE confusing; isn’t Ar. asking us HERE to really see the radical difference between PRAISE and HONOR with regards to the best, most complete and self-sufficient principle which IS happiness? Unlike Joachim, we must persevere in our puzzle, mustn’t we? Isn’t this dramatic tension precisely why we say again that one could spend one’s entire life trying to understand this, usually found to be rather irrelevant passage? Continue Reading »





Aunque llevo su nombre, no he tenido la fortuna de visitar nuestro hermoso archipiélago colombiano caribeño de San Andrés y Providencia. [1] Pero no tengo que conocerlo para poder sentir, como colombiano que soy, las serias dificultades en las que la decisión de la Corte Internacional de Justicia (CIJ) —Corte que no ha cumplido aún los 100 años de existencia dentro de la compleja y larga historia humana de instituciones políticas [2]—- ha puesto a los conciudadanos de nuestro departamento isleño. Como lo pone una columnista de la isla: “nuestras lágrimas se confunden con el mar”. [3] Las nuestras también; ellas se confunden con las aguas, hasta hace poco protegidas, de su mar. Sin duda alguna ningún ciudadano nicaragüense se ha visto así afectado. Y tan es así que parece hay poquísimas columnas nicaragüenses sobre el tema, con excepciones como la muy cuestionable escrita por el médico Mauricio Mendieta. [4] Tal vez sea porque, un poco injustamente (!), no he buscado con mucho esmero; pero sea como sea a la del doctor Mendieta regresaremos.

Y el golpe es doble, por no decir bajo. No sólo porque dicha decisión ha exacerbado/podría exacerbar aún más las tensiones al EXTERIOR con el mismo país Nicaragua (incluso algunos opinan, no sin razón, que también con Venezuela)[5] , sino —-más grave aún—– lo ha hecho, como veremos, al INTERIOR mismo de nuestro país. Ya el Presidente Santos, muy probablemente merecidamente/justamente, ha caído en los sondeos en más de 10 puntos. [6]

Pero además, y esto es de conocimiento de la CIJ  —–o debería serlo, ya que la CIJ es defensora, y debe ser ejemplo, del “deber ser”—– la decisión llega en momentos en que al MISMO tiempo y con gran coraje Colombia inicia un proceso de paz frente a la guerrilla de las FARC en Cuba luego de más de 60 años de violencia ininterrumpida. Ya los efectos en este sentido también se han hecho sentir; si antes de la decisión el optimismo ante el proceso de paz con la FARC llegaba a 41.6%, ahora lo hace tan solo al 25.7%. [7]

Por ello debemos preguntar: ¿acaso no comprende la CIJ los alcances de su “poder”? ¿Acaso esa comprensión no implica cierta postura autocrítica y prudencial? ¿O es que los criterios de justicia de la CIJ, para poder funcionar, deben recurrir a una cierta objetividad que sigue de cierta manera el modelo moderno de la ciencia, dentro del cual lo realmente importante termina, en últimas, siendo secundario? ¿Pero no sería esto extraño, a saber, que lo fundamental pasara a segundo o tercer plano? ¿Qué postura ante la cuestión de la justicia internacional permitiría semejante reversos? Por ejemplo, ¿acaso la problemática de la justicia es tan solo, o siquiera fundamentalmente encontrar el adecuado ratio entre “x” y “y”, a saber el 8 a 1 casi orgullosamente presentado por la CIJ en el caso en disputa como resolución al conflicto limítrofe? O más conceptualmente, ¿es acaso la justicia en su más fundamental concepción reducible a cuestiones de justicia retributiva? Pero, ¿no sabemos todos de memoria ya que la justicia también tiene que ver con aspectos distributivos, es decir, de meritocracia? Para ser claros, ¿no es por ello que Colombia se ha sentido vulnerada por una decisión que no corresponde a SUS méritos dentro de la región? Por ejemplo, ¿no ha sido Colombia clara en su protección de la Biósfera Seaflower declarada “por la UNESCO como Reserva (para la humanidad) en el año 2001 por sus ecosistemas terrestres, costeros y marinos; constituidos por manglares, pastizales marinos y arrecifes coralinos”, [8] a diferencia de los Nicaragüenses, uno de los cuales es el mencionado doctor Mendieta quien escribe:

“Simultáneamente a esa acción en la ONU, Nicaragua debe comenzar ordenadamente a otorgar concesiones pesqueras en la zona, así como también autorizar las muy importantes exploraciones petroleras en la zona.” [9]

O en palabras del columnista isleño Micky Calero, quien al preguntarse: “¿Qué va pasar con esa reserva ahora que la Corte Internacional de la Haya entregó parte de esa aguas a la nación de Nicaragua?”, se autoresponde de manera preocupante:

“… el Gobierno de Nicaragua …. ha expresado claramente al decir que como Colombia no quiso el petróleo, ellos sí. En una entrevista televisada uno de sus diputados lo expresó con esas mismas palabras.” [10]

Por ello volvemos a preguntar, ¿es la pregunta por la justicia reducible a cuestiones retributivas, la que pareciera ser la postura de la CIJ? ¿No es esto de entrada una cierta injusticia? A ello volveremos.

Pensadores políticos de incomparable altura como Aristóteles —-que no pertenecen a la “tradición” de la Corte— son claros al respecto: esa reducción es de hecho injusta/incompleta. [11] Estos pensadores que cuestionan inteligentemente “tradiciones” como las que se encuentran a la base de la CIJ  —que podría recibir el nombre de “idealismo moderno”, tradición inaugurada por Grotius y desarrollado  aún más por Kant— son recuperados de manera crítica en obras tales como la impresionante Justice Among Nations (Justicia entre las Naciones), co-escrita dialógicamente por los Profesores Pangle y Ahrensdorf. Su subtítulo es llamativo: “On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace” (“De la base moral para el poder y la paz”). [12] No recuerdo cómo se llamaban esos libros cortos que resumían las grandes obras clásicas en pocas páginas (¡por ejemplo, Don Quijote en 50 páginas!), y que eran  usados por estudiantes “con poco tiempo para leer” para poder pasar los exámenes. Todos los involucrados en esta crisis debemos buscar esos resúmenes con urgencia para este libro;  o, preferiblemente, leer el original. Ya volveremos a ello.

Pero de manera concreta y como lo indica críticamente en el mismo sentido el siempre agudo General colombiano Valencia Tovar:

“No me parece que la suerte de diferendos entre Estados y naciones deba dirimirse ante magistrados ajenos a las realidades de pueblos y circunstancias, que ni siquiera se toman el trabajo de visitar las áreas de conflictos bilaterales para conocer la idiosincrasia de los pobladores y compenetrarse con la realidad histórica y jurídica de los diferendos.” [13]

Si lo que el General indica es veraz, entonces nos cabe preguntar de nuevo: ¿no es esta postura en cierto manera un efecto del deseo de PURA objetividad que caracteriza a la CIJ como ente radicalmente moderno? Porque, ¿para qué adentrarse en las subjetividades de las partes en conflicto, si tenemos una especie de “manual”  —o peor aún un imaginario mental rígido incuestionable—- que hace caso omiso de estos elementos? Resolución retributiva = Nicaragua 8 – Colombia 1. [14] ¿Cómo lo sabemos? Midiendo (desde lejos).  Y, profundizando aún más en la misma línea, no en vano también preguntan muchos como el isleño Israel Jackson: ¿Cómo pretende la CIJ legislar de manera definitiva e irreversible sobre la Reserva de la Biósfera Seaflower –—que va mucho más allá de los intereses de Colombia y Nicaragua; va más allá de lo político y lo humano—- sin haberse “adentrado” en sus aguas? Porque debemos preguntar, ¿acaso la CIJ también tiene jurisdicción sobre los bienes naturales no-humanos?  Y si fuese así, ¿de dónde exactamente obtendría semejante  autorización de la fauna y la flora? ¿Acaso dicha fauna, dicha flora, han firmado algún contrato o tratado? [15]

Ahora bien, si las anteriores preguntas tienen algo de poder argumentativo y racional, entonces, ¿a qué tipo de justicia hace referencia la sentencia de la CIJ? Porque resultaría en verdad irónico que el objetivo de la CIJ, a saber “to settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by States”,  (“resolver, de acuerdo a la ley internacional las disputas legales presentadas por Estados”) [16] fuese simultáneamente subvertido por la desestabilización de los Estados mismos que VOLUNTARIAMENTE y en buena fe recurren a su “sabiduría” por el BIEN de la comunidad de Estados Internacionales interesados en un mundo más seguro y pacífico. Y Nicaragua con su terrible historia fratricida, también sabe —-o debería recordar—– lo que está en juego al desestabilizar el proceso de paz colombiano con las, poco queridas y poco admiradas, FARC. Y si Colombia fuese  un poder nuclear: ¿qué peligroso sería su desestabilización, no es verdad? Repitamos: una CIJ sin Estados, pues resulta irrelevante. No en vano Colombia se ha retirado del Pacto de Bogotá. Y de manera similar, una isla sin un mar justo resulta pues un continente, pero pequeñito y en vía de extinción (!?).

O en otras palabras, todos nosotros colombianos recordamos las palabras de nuestro famoso entrenador de fútbol Maturana a las que hace alusión la caricatura de Matador con las que comienza este muy incompleto comentario: “Perder es ganar un poco”. [17] Pero perder en fútbol es una cosa, perder soberanía otra muy diferente, una pérdida peligrosa: sobretodo si una de las partes considera que luego de su buena fe —y con argumentos sólidos— la decisión ha sido desmedida, desproporcionada y/o equivocada; es decir, injusta. Y es que, como indicamos, el modelo de justicia de la corte no es el único que los seres humanos han imaginado a lo largo de los siglos. Porque de nuevo resultaría extraño que sólo desde los años 1940 —época del surgimiento de la CIJ—- realmente nosotros los humanos al fin entendiéramos lo que es la justicia. A manera de ejemplo, ¿no presupone esta ideología una subyacente visión progresista de la historia en la que concepciones anteriores son simplemente consideradas como obscurantistas, o incluso infantiles? Pero no, como dijimos hay otras concepciones, y con una tradición reflexiva que incluye nombres de grandes como Tucídides, Sócrates, Aristóteles, y Cíceron. Es a ellos a quienes debemos recurrir para tratar, no sólo de hacer entender a la CIJ su inevitable pero preocupante ceguera, sino también y mucho más importante para que como ciudadanos colombianos entendamos en dónde nos encontramos frente a estos hechos y qué argumentos podemos manejar en nuestra defensa. Porque si se los dejamos sólo a abogados “expertos”, en un lugar por allá llamado La Haya, ya sabemos cómo terminamos, no? Terminamos no en “La Haya”, sino en “la olla”. Es así como un jurista denunció que el 99% de nosotros los colombianos estamos en la penumbre frente a los eventos que implican la pérdida de nuestro territorio. !Inaudito! [18] En contraste, el modelo de justicia inspirado en la obra de Tucídides comienza precisamente desde polos opuestos directamente conectados, en parte, con la participación de los mejores ciudadanos en los temas de trascendencia de su nación. Tales pensadores cuya obra ha resistido los vaivenes de más de dos siglos:

“were ceaselessly preoccupied with demonstrating how their reflections necessarily emerged from, and were elicited by, the passionate concerns and questions of practicing statesmen and citizens.”  (“estaban incesantemente preocupados por demostrar cómo sus reflexiones necesariamente surgían, y eran generadas, por las apasionadas preocupaciones y preguntas de sus estadistas y ciudadanos activos.”) [19]

Nada más alejado de una concepción de la justicia como objetividad pura.

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